Distributed relay-source matching for cooperative wireless networks using two-sided market games

Authors:
Dapeng Li;Jing Liu;Youyun Xu;Xinbing Wang;Wen Chen
Affiliations:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Venue:
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Year:
2009

Citing 10
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Distributed relay selection over multi-source and multi-relay wireless cooperative networks with selfish nodes

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Abstract

In this paper, we address the incentive-based relay-selection problem over multi-source and multi-relay wireless networks. A two-side market game approach is employed to jointly consider the benefits of all sources and relays. The equilibrium concept in such games is called core. The outcomes in the core of the game cannot be improved upon by any subset of players. These outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance the benefits of all sources and relays. When the price assumes only discrete values, the core of the game is defined as discrete core. The Distributed Source-Relay Assignment (DSRA) algorithm is proposed for competitive price adjustment and converges to the discrete core of the game. With small enough measurement of price, the algorithm can achieve the optimal performance compared with centralized one in terms of total profit of the system.