An insider-resistant group key exchange protocol without signatures

Authors:
Hai Huang;Zhenfu Cao
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Venue:
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Year:
2009

Citing 8
Cited 1

How to construct random functions

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols

FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Modeling insider attacks on group key-exchange protocols

Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Securing group key exchange against strong corruptions and key registration attacks

International Journal of Applied Cryptography
(Password) authenticated key establishment: from 2-party to group

TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol

CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Malicious participants in group key exchange: key control and contributiveness in the shadow of trust

ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing

Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol

Information Sciences: an International Journal

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The well-known method for a group key exchange (GKE) protocol to be against insider attack is to make use of signatures. However, using signatures considerably degrades the performance of the GKE protocol. In this paper, we propose a new method to resist insider attack. The underlying tool of our method is a two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which can be used to authenticate all other participants' session identifiers instead of using signatures. Based on the two-party AKE protocol, we propose an efficient insider-resistant GKE protocol without signatures. We show that our proposal is provably secure against insider attack if the underlying two-party AKE protocol is secure.