Security analysis of enterprise network based on stochastic game nets model

Authors:
Yuanzhuo Wang;Chuang Lin;Yang Wang;Kun Meng
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Venue:
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Year:
2009

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a novel modeling method, Stochastic Game Nets (SGN), and use it to model and analyze the security issues in enterprise networks. Firstly, the definition and modeling algorithm of Stochastic Game Nets are given. And then we apply the Stochastic Game Nets method to describe the attack and defense course in the enterprise networks successfully, and find a Nash equilibrium. Finally we analyze the confidentiality and integrity of the enterprise network quantificationally based on the model. The method can also be applied to other areas with respect to a game.