Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Featuring the Internet
Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Featuring the Internet
TRIBLER: a social-based peer-to-peer system: Research Articles
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience - Recent Advances in Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security (P2P 2006)
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Price differentiation all-pay auction-based incentives in bittorrent
GPC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
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BitTorrent is the dominating protocol in nearly all regions. Various reputation models and incentive mechanisms are proposed in recent years. However, many of them are designed for general peer-to-peer networks, only a few are designed for BitTorrent even though some models and mechanisms assert that they can be applied to BitTorrent-like systems. In this paper, we propose an incentive framework based on reputation history instead of tit-for-tat in BitTorrent. It is derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value that will encourage selfish peers who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to Nash equilibrium. We show that this profit sharing framework exhibits several fairness properties that support the argument that this distribution of profit is desirable. Moreover, we improve SepRep reputation model and tailor it to the needs of BitTorrent protocol. In particular, we utilize the tracker of BitTorrent to process global reputation and trust values assisting the local values maintained by each peer.