Evolutionary games in wireless networks

  • Authors:
  • Hamidou Tembine;Eitan Altman;Rachid El-Azouzi;Yezekael Hayel

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon, Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique, University of Avignon, Avignon Cedex 9, France;Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, Centre Sophia-Antipolis, Sophia-Antipolis Cedex, France;Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon, Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique, University of Avignon, Avignon Cedex 9, France;Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon, Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique, University of Avignon, Avignon Cedex 9, France

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We consider a noncooperative interaction among a large population of mobiles that interfere with each other through many local interactions. The first objective of this paper is to extend the evolutionary game framework to allow an arbitrary number of mobiles that are involved in a local interaction. We allow for interactions between mobiles that are not necessarily reciprocal. We study 1) multiple-access control in a slotted Aloha-based wireless network and 2) power control in wideband codedivision multiple-access wireless networks. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called evolutionarily stable strategy) for these games and study the influence of wireless channels and pricing on the evolution of dynamics and the equilibrium.