Practical Byzantine fault tolerance
OSDI '99 Proceedings of the third symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
The State of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue on towards a quarter-century of public key cryptography
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
An algebraic approach to network coding
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Comprehensive view of a live network coding P2P system
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Network Coding for Efficient Wireless Unicast
IZS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 International Zurich Seminar on Communications
Byzantine attacks against network coding in peer to peer distributed storage
ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 2
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A Random Linear Network Coding Approach to Multicast
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Byzantine Modification Detection in Multicast Networks With Random Network Coding
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Coding for Errors and Erasures in Random Network Coding
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Full length article: On coding for reliable communication over packet networks
Physical Communication
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Random linear network coding can be used in peer-to-peer networks to increase the efficiency of content distribution and distributed storage. However, these systems are particularly susceptible to Byzantine attacks. We quantify the impact of Byzantine attacks on the coded system by evaluating the probability that a receiver node fails to correctly recover a file. We show that even for a small probability of attack, the system fails with overwhelming probability. We then propose a novel signature scheme that allows packet-level Byzantine detection. This scheme allows one-hop containment of the contamination, and saves bandwidth by allowing nodes to detect and drop the contaminated packets. We compare the net cost of our signature scheme with various other Byzantine schemes, and show that when the probability of Byzantine attacks is high, our scheme is the most bandwidth efficient.