On counteracting byzantine attacks in network coded peer-to-peer networks

  • Authors:
  • MinJi Kim;Luísa Lima;Fang Zhao;João Barros;Muriel Médard;Ralf Koetter;Ton Kalker;Keesook J. Han

  • Affiliations:
  • Research Laboratory of Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA;Instituto de Telecomunicações, Department of Computer Science, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade do Porto, Portugal;Research Laboratory of Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA;Instituto de Telecomunicações, Departamento de Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores, Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto, Portugal;Research Laboratory of Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA;Institute for Communications Engineering of the Technischen Universitaet Muenchen, Germany;Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, CA;Air Force Research Laboratory, NY

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Random linear network coding can be used in peer-to-peer networks to increase the efficiency of content distribution and distributed storage. However, these systems are particularly susceptible to Byzantine attacks. We quantify the impact of Byzantine attacks on the coded system by evaluating the probability that a receiver node fails to correctly recover a file. We show that even for a small probability of attack, the system fails with overwhelming probability. We then propose a novel signature scheme that allows packet-level Byzantine detection. This scheme allows one-hop containment of the contamination, and saves bandwidth by allowing nodes to detect and drop the contaminated packets. We compare the net cost of our signature scheme with various other Byzantine schemes, and show that when the probability of Byzantine attacks is high, our scheme is the most bandwidth efficient.