Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-brain
Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-brain
The computational brain
Adaptive Behavior
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again
Introduction to Reinforcement Learning
Introduction to Reinforcement Learning
Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain
Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain
Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems
Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems
Is the homunculus "aware" of sensory adaptation?
Neural Computation
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According to John Haugeland, the capacity for "authentic intentionality" depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland's view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand "authentic intentionality". This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure of the environments where brain sensory systems evolved and develop. The objection that I equivocate on what Haugeland means by "commitment to standards" is rebutted by introducing the notion of "florid, self-conscious representing". Were the hypothesis presented plausible, computational neuroscience would offer a promising framework for a better understanding of the conditions for meaningful representation.