Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks: a game theoretic approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Analysis of topological characteristics of huge online social networking services
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Clustering and sharing incentives in BitTorrent systems
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Can internet video-on-demand be profitable?
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
The Delicate Tradeoffs in BitTorrent-like File Sharing Protocol Design
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in p2p systems
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Peer-assisted content distribution with prices
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Sybil-resilient online content voting
NSDI'09 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX symposium on Networked systems design and implementation
Davis Social Links: Leveraging Social Networks for Future Internet Communication
SAINT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Ninth Annual International Symposium on Applications and the Internet
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Peer-assisted online games with social reciprocity
Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Workshop on Quality of Service
Social market: combining explicit and implicit social networks
SSS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
Bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Evaluating stranger policies in P2P file-sharing systems with reciprocity mechanisms
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Strategic formation of credit networks
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Peer-to-peer indirect reciprocity via personal currency
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Trust-aware peer sampling: Performance and privacy tradeoffs
Theoretical Computer Science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The success of future P2P applications ultimately depends on whether users will contribute their bandwidth, CPU and storage resources to a larger community. In this paper, we propose a new incentive paradigm, Networked Asynchronous Bilateral Trading (NABT), which can be applied to a broad range of P2P applications. In NABT, peers belong to an underlying social network, and each pair of friends keeps track of a credit balance between them. When user Alice provides a service (a file, storage space, computation and so on) to her friend Bob, she charges Bob credits. Thus, in NABT, there is no global currency; instead, there are only credit balances maintained between pairs of friends. NABT allows peers to supply each other asynchronously and further allows peers to trade with remote peers through intermediaries. We theoretically show that NABT is perfectly efficient with balanced demands and supports "networked tit-for-tat". The efficiency of NABT with unbalanced demands is determined by the min-cut of credit limits of the underlying social network. Using simulations driven by MySpace traces, we demonstrate that a simple two-hop NABT design can have high trading efficiency, provide service differentiation, exploit trading intermediaries, and discourage free-riders.