Secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Wireless Networks
Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
TrueLink: A Practical Countermeasure to the Wormhole Attack in Wireless Networks
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
ODSBR: An on-demand secure Byzantine resilient routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selfish Behavior in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing
AntNet: distributed stigmergetic control for communications networks
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Secure data communication in mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
CTAC: Control traffic tunneling attacks' countermeasures in mobile wireless networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Cross-layer metrics for reliable routing in wireless mesh networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Matrix-based pairwise key establishment for wireless mesh networks
Future Generation Computer Systems
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Wireless ad hoc networks are inherently vulnerable, as any node can disrupt the communication of potentially any other node in the network. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. In this paper, we take a fresh and comprehensive approach that addresses simultaneously three aspects: security, scalability and adaptability to changing network conditions. Our communication protocol, Castor, occupies a unique point in the design space: It does not use any control messages except simple packet acknowledgements, and each node makes routing decisions locally and independently without exchanging any routing state with other nodes. Its novel design makes Castor resilient to a wide range of attacks and allows the protocol to scale to large network sizes and to remain efficient under high mobility. We compare Castor against four representative protocols from the literature. Our protocol achieves up to two times higher packet delivery rates, particularly in large and highly volatile networks, while incurring no or only limited additional overhead. At the same time, Castor is able to survive more severe attacks and recovers from them faster.