Brief announcement: improving social-network-based sybil-resilient node admission control

Authors:
Nguyen Tran;Jinyang Li;Lakshminarayanan Subramanian;Sherman S.M. Chow
Affiliations:
New York University, New York, NY, USA;New York University, New York, NY, USA;New York University, New York, NY, USA;New York University, New York, NY, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Year:
2010

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Abstract

We present Gatekeeper, a decentralized protocol that performs Sybil-resilient node admission control based on a social network. Gatekeeper can admit most honest nodes while limiting the number of Sybils admitted per attack edge to O(log k), where k is the number of attack edges. Our result improves over SybilLimit [3] by a factor of log n in the face of O(1) attack edges. Even when the number of attack edges reaches O(n/ log n), Gatekeeper only admits O(log n) Sybils per attack edge, similar to that achieved by SybilLimit.