Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Games for exchanging information
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
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We consider the rational secret sharing problem introduced by Halpern and Teague [1]. Some positive results have been derived by Kol and Naor[3] by considering that players only prefer to learn.The solution considers that players are of two types; one player is the short player and the rest of the players are long players. But their protocol is susceptible to coalitions if the short player colludes with any of the long players. We extend their protocol, and propose a completely collusion free, &3949;-Nash equilibrium protocol, when n ≥ 2m-1, where n is the number of players and m is the number of shares needed to construct the secret.