Model checking detectability of attacks in multiagent systems

Authors:
Ioana Boureanu;Mika Cohen;Alessio Lomuscio
Affiliations:
Imperial College London, UK;Imperial College London, UK;Imperial College London, UK
Venue:
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Year:
2010

Citing 12
Cited 1

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Abstract

Information security is vital to many multiagent system applications. In this paper we formalise the notion of detectability of attacks in a MAS setting and analyse its applicability. We introduce a taxonomy of detectability specifications expressed in temporal-epistemic logic. We illustrate the practical relevance of attack detectability in a case study applied to a variant of Kerberos protocol. We model-check attack detectability in automatically generated MAS models for security protocols.