He says, she says: conflict and coordination in Wikipedia
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
HICSS '07 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Cooperation and quality in wikipedia
Proceedings of the 2007 international symposium on Wikis
Community, consensus, coercion, control: cs*w or how policy mediates mass participation
Proceedings of the 2007 international ACM conference on Supporting group work
Ontology evaluation using wikipedia categories for browsing
Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on Conference on information and knowledge management
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 3
Wikipedia-based semantic interpretation for natural language processing
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
WikiWalk: random walks on Wikipedia for semantic relatedness
TextGraphs-4 Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on Graph-based Methods for Natural Language Processing
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We introduce a game setting called a joint process, where the history of actions determine the state, and the state and agent properties determine the payoff. This setting is a special case of stochastic games and is a natural model for situations with alternating control. Joint process games have applications as diverse as aggregate rating sites and wiki page updates. These games are related to Black's median voter theorem and also strongly connected to Moulin's strategy-proof voting schemes. When each agent has a personal goal, we look at how the play converges under a simple myopic action rule, and prove that not only do these simple dynamics converge, but the actions selected also form a Nash equilibrium. The convergence point is not the mean or the median of the set of agent goals; instead we prove the convergence point is the median of the set of agent goals and a set of focal points. This work provides the first theoretical model of wiki-type behavior and opens the door to more questions about the properties of these games.