Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Cryptanalysis of the A5/1 GSM Stream Cipher
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC
FSE '00 Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
A man-in-the-middle attack on UMTS
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for UMTS with Low Bandwidth Consumption
AINA '05 Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Volume 1
A new authentication protocol for UMTS mobile networks
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication
Journal of Cryptology
A Hardware-Assisted Realtime Attack on A5/2 Without Precomputations
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Conditional estimators: an effective attack on A5/1
SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Security analysis and enhancements of 3GPP authentication and key agreement protocol
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Questioning the Feasibility of UMTS-GSM Interworking Attacks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
SMSCrypto: A lightweight cryptographic framework for secure SMS transmission
Journal of Systems and Software
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In this paper we first present three new attacks on Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) in access domain. We exploit the interoperation of UMTS network with its predecessor, Global System for Mobile communications (GSMs). Two attacks result in the interception of the entire traffic of the victim UMTS subscriber in the GSM access area of UMTS network. These attacks are applicable, regardless of the strength of the selected GSM encryption algorithm. The third attack is an impersonation attack and allows the attacker to impersonate a genuine UMTS subscriber to a UMTS network and fool the network to provide services at the expense of the victim subscriber. Then, we propose some countermeasures to strengthen the UMTS network against the mentioned attacks with emphasis on the practicality in present networks. The proposed solutions require limited change of the network elements or protocols, insignificant additional computational load on the network elements and negligible additional bandwidth consumption on the network links.