Digital signets: self-enforcing protection of digital information (preliminary version)
STOC '96 Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An Asymmetric Traceability Scheme for Copyright Protection without Trust Assumptions
EC-Web 2001 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Asymmetric Self-Enforcement Scheme with Public Traceability
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Privacy and Ownership Preserving of Outsourced Medical Data
ICDE '05 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Data Engineering
Towards an open, trusted digital rights management platform
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Digital rights management
A four-layer model for security of digital rights management
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Assessing privacy criteria for drm using eu privacy legislation
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Digital rights management
Data Hemorrhages in the Health-Care Sector
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Medical information privacy assurance: cryptographic and system aspects
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
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Electronic health records are increasingly used to enhance availability, recovery, and transfer of health records. Newly developed online health systems such as Google-Health create new security and privacy risks. In this paper, we elucidate a clear threat model for online health information systems. We distinguish between privacy and security threats. In response to these risks, we propose a traitor-tracing solution, which embeds proof to trace an attacker who leaks data from a repository. We argue that the application of traitor-tracing techniques to online health systems can align incentives and decrease risks.