Is There a Violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game?

  • Authors:
  • Shu Li;Zuo-Jun Wang;Li-Lin Rao;Yan-Mei Li

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Social & Economic Behavior, Instituteof Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Center for Social & Economic Behavior, Instituteof Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Center for Social & Economic Behavior, Instituteof Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Center for Social & Economic Behavior, Instituteof Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • Adaptive Behavior - Animals, Animats, Software Agents, Robots, Adaptive Systems
  • Year:
  • 2010

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This report seeks to determine whether the violation of Savage's sure-thing principle is robust enough to survive in an original payoff domain of the prisoner's dilemma game. It was found that the sure-thing principle was violated in the domain of gains as expected by Shafir and Tversky but obeyed in the domain of losses. It was further found that the sure-thing principle was also obeyed in the original prison sentence payoffs, which fall into the domain of losses. The findings suggest a reexamination of the application of the sure-thing principle in the prisoner's dilemma game.