Eliminating the hypervisor attack surface for a more secure cloud
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Architectural support for hypervisor-secure virtualization
ASPLOS XVII Proceedings of the seventeenth international conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
Architectural support for secure virtualization under a vulnerable hypervisor
Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
Auditing cloud management using information flow tracking
Proceedings of the seventh ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
A survey of security issues in hardware virtualization
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Characterizing hypervisor vulnerabilities in cloud computing servers
Proceedings of the 2013 international workshop on Security in cloud computing
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Virtualization is a rapidly evolving technology that can be used to provide a range of benefits to computing systems, including improved resource utilization, software portability, and reliability. For security-critical applications, it is highly desirable to have a small trusted computing base (TCB), since it minimizes the surface of attacks that could jeopardize the security of the entire system. In traditional virtualization architectures, the TCB for an application includes not only the hardware and the virtual machine monitor (VMM), but also the whole management operating system (OS) that contains the device drivers and virtual machine (VM) management functionality. For many applications, it is not acceptable to trust this management OS, due to its large code base and abundance of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we address the problem of providing a secure execution environment on a virtualized computing platform under the assumption of an untrusted management OS. We propose a secure virtualization architecture that provides a secure run-time environment, network interface, and secondary storage for a guest VM. The proposed architecture significantly reduces the TCB of security-critical guest VMs, leading to improved security in an untrusted management environment. We have implemented a prototype of the proposed approach using the Xen virtualization system, and demonstrated how it can be used to facilitate secure remote computing services. We evaluate the performance penalties incurred by the proposed architecture, and demonstrate that the penalties are minimal.