A certifying compiler for zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge based on Σ-protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Computer-aided security proofs for the working cryptographer
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Verified indifferentiable hashing into elliptic curves
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Full proof cryptography: verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge protocols
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Zero-knowledge proofs have a vast applicability in the domain of cryptography, stemming from the fact that they can be used to force potentially malicious parties to abide by the rules of a protocol, without forcing them to reveal their secrets. Σ-protocols are a class of zero-knowledge proofs that can be implemented efficiently and that suffice for a great variety of practical applications. This paper presents a first machine-checked formalization of a comprehensive theory of Σ-protocols. The development includes basic definitions, relations between different security properties that appear in the literature, and general composability theorems. We show its usefulness by formalizing—and proving the security—of concrete instances of several well-known protocols. The formalization builds on CertiCrypt, a framework that provides support to reason about cryptographic systems in the Coq proof assistant, and that has been previously used to formalize security proofs of encryption and signature schemes.