Cognitive radios for dynamic spectrum access: from concept to reality
IEEE Wireless Communications
Cryptographic link signatures for spectrum usage authentication in cognitive radio
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To address the increasing demand for wireless bandwidth, cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been proposed to increase the efficiency of channel utilization; they enable the sharing of channels among secondary (unlicensed) and primary (licensed) users on a non-interference basis. A secondary user in a CRN should constantly monitor for the presence of a primary user's signal to avoid interfering with the primary user. However, to gain unfair share of radio channels, an attacker (e.g., a selfish secondary user) may mimic a primary user's signal to evict other secondary users. Therefore, a secure primary user detection method that can distinguish a primary user's signal from an attacker's signal is needed. A unique challenge in addressing this problem is that Federal Communications Commission (FCC) prohibits any modification to primary users. Consequently, existing cryptographic techniques cannot be used directly. In this paper, we develop a novel approach for authenticating primary users' signals in CRNs, which conforms to FCC's requirement. Our approach integrates cryptographic signatures and wireless link signatures (derived from physical radio channel characteristics) to enable primary user detection in the presence of attackers. Essential to our approach is a {\em helper node} placed physically close to a primary user. The helper node serves as a "bridge" to enable a secondary user to verify cryptographic signatures carried by the helper node's signals and then obtain the helper node's authentic link signatures to verify the primary user's signals. A key contribution in our paper is a novel physical layer authentication technique that enables the helper node to authenticate signals from its associated primary user. Unlike previous techniques for link signatures, our approach explores the geographical proximity of the helper node to the primary user, and thus does not require any training process.