Stable internet routing without global coordination
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The stable paths problem and interdomain routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Modeling adoptability of secure BGP protocol
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
AS relationships: inference and validation
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Origin authentication in interdomain routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
PHAS: a prefix hijack alert system
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Autonomous security for autonomous systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Cyclops: the AS-level connectivity observatory
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Let the market drive deployment: a strategy for transitioning to BGP security
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
Modeling on quicksand: dealing with the scarcity of ground truth in interdomain routing data
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Sign what you really care about --- secure BGP AS paths efficiently
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
Computational complexity of traffic hijacking under BGP and S-BGP
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Provable security of S-BGP and other path vector protocols: model, analysis and extensions
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting prefix hijackings in the internet with argus
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
How to prevent AS hijacking attacks
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on CoNEXT student workshop
Emulation on the internet prefix hijacking attack impaction
ICT-EurAsia'13 Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Information and Communication Technology
BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
Sign what you really care about - Secure BGP AS-paths efficiently
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
CoDef: collaborative defense against large-scale link-flooding attacks
Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
On the risk of misbehaving RPKI authorities
Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
A survey of interdomain routing policies
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
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In response to high-profile Internet outages, BGP security variants have been proposed to prevent the propagation of bogus routing information. To inform discussions of which variant should be deployed in the Internet, we quantify the ability of the main protocols (origin authentication, soBGP, S-BGP, and data-plane verification) to blunt traffic-attraction attacks; i.e., an attacker that deliberately attracts traffic to drop, tamper, or eavesdrop on packets. Intuition suggests that an attacker can maximize the traffic he attracts by widely announcing a short path that is not flagged as bogus by the secure protocol. Through simulations on an empirically-determined AS-level topology, we show that this strategy is surprisingly effective, even when the network uses an advanced security solution like S-BGP or data-plane verification. Worse yet, we show that these results underestimate the severity of attacks. We prove that finding the most damaging strategy is NP-hard, and show how counterintuitive strategies, like announcing longer paths, announcing to fewer neighbors, or triggering BGP loop-detection, can be used to attract even more traffic than the strategy above. These counterintuitive examples are not merely hypothetical; we searched the empirical AS topology to identify specific ASes that can launch them. Finally, we find that a clever export policy can often attract almost as much traffic as a bogus path announcement. Thus, our work implies that mechanisms that police export policies (e.g., defensive filtering) are crucial, even if S-BGP is fully deployed.