Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Clustering and sharing incentives in BitTorrent systems
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Bittorrent is an auction: analyzing and improving bittorrent's incentives
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
On the Impact of Greedy Strategies in BitTorrent Networks: The Case of BitTyrant
P2P '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Eighth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
IPTPS'08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Design space analysis for modeling incentives in distributed systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
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Recent work on BitTorrent has shown that the choke/unchoke mechanism implements an auction where each peer tries to induce other peers into "unchoking" it by uploading more data than competing peers. Under such a scenario, fast peers tend to trade with one another and neglect slower peers. In this work, we revisit the peer-to-peer (p2p) file distribution problem and show that this does not have to be the case. We describe a p2p file distribution algorithm, the Tit-For-Tat Transport Protocol (TFTTP), that is able to achieve faster download performance than BitTorrent by employing a new mechanism called a promise. Our experiments show that the average throughput for TFTTP is some 30% to 70% higher than that for BitTorrent under controlled and realistic network conditions. We also show that TFTTP exhibits fairer sharing behavior and avoids the situation where "winner takes all".