The small core of the German corporate board network

Authors:
Mishael Milaković;Simone Alfarano;Thomas Lux
Affiliations:
Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany;Department of Economics, University of Castellón (Jaume I), Castellón de la Plana, Spain;Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
Venue:
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Year:
2010

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Abstract

We consider the bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. The board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies appear to be the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany's corporate network.