The need to consider both object identity and behavior in establishing the trustworthiness of network devices within a Smart Grid

Authors:
Owen McCusker;Benjamin Gittins;Joel Glanfield;Scott Brunza;Stephen Brooks
Affiliations:
Sonalysts, Inc., Waterford, CT;Synaptic Laboratories Limited, Nadur, Gozo, Malta, Europe;Dalhousie U., Halifax, NS, Canada;Sonalysts, Inc., Waterford, CT;Dalhousie U., Halifax, NS, Canada
Venue:
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Today's distributed computing environments, like Energy Control Systems, lack a common and adaptive notion of trust and are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks from complex threats. These threats on our control systems are distributed, decentralized, dynamic, and operate over multiple timescales. Threats may also result from structural weaknesses in system designs that permit exploitation by insiders working inside globally trusted service providers. Although approaches such as Trusted Computing are part of the solution, we argue that a layered notion of distributed trust is required to effectively address the end-to-end security needs of these systems.