Measuring the user's anonymity when disclosing personal properties

  • Authors:
  • Kristof Verslype;Bart De Decker

  • Affiliations:
  • K.U. Leuven, Heverlee, Belgium;K.U. Leuven, Heverlee, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Security Measurements and Metrics
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Anonymous credentials allow to selectively disclose personal properties included in the credential, while hiding the other information. For instance, a user could only disclose that he is an adult using a credential in which zip code and date of birth are included, which remain hidden for the verifier. This is a considerable improvement w.r.t. the user's anonymity. However, by disclosing too much personal properties, the user can drastically decrease his anonymity and can even become identifiable. Credentials can be shown multiple times under the same pseudonym, making usages of the same credential linkable which introduces new anonymity threats. These threats are discussed in this paper and a method is proposed whereby a user agent retrieves data in order to inform the user about his minimum level of anonymity w.r.t. a particular service provider.