Device driver safety through a reference validation mechanism

  • Authors:
  • Dan Williams;Patrick Reynolds;Kevin Walsh;Emin Gün Sirer;Fred B. Schneider

  • Affiliations:
  • Cornell University;Cornell University;Cornell University;Cornell University;Cornell University

  • Venue:
  • OSDI'08 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Device drivers typically execute in supervisor mode and thus must be fully trusted. This paper describes how to move them out of the trusted computing base, by running them without supervisor privileges and constraining their interactions with hardware devices. An implementation of this approach in the Nexus operating system executes drivers in user space, leveraging hardware isolation and checking their behavior against a safety specification. These Nexus drivers have performance comparable to inkernel, trusted drivers, with a level of CPU overhead acceptable for most applications. For example, the monitored driver for an Intel e1000 Ethernet card has throughput comparable to a trusted driver for the same hardware under Linux. And a monitored driver for the Intel i810 sound card provides continuous playback. Drivers for a disk and a USB mouse have also been moved successfully to operate in user space with safety specifications.