Proxychain: developing a robust and efficient authentication infrastructure for carrier-scale VoIP networks

  • Authors:
  • Italo Dacosta;Patrick Traynor

  • Affiliations:
  • Converging Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Georgia Tech Information Security Center, Georgia Institute of Technology;Converging Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Georgia Tech Information Security Center, Georgia Institute of Technology

  • Venue:
  • USENIXATC'10 Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX conference on USENIX annual technical conference
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Authentication is an important mechanism for the reliable operation of any Voice over IP (VoIP) infrastructure. Digest authentication has become the most widely adopted VoIP authentication protocol due to its simple properties. However, even this lightweight protocol can have a significant impact on the performance and scalability of a VoIP infrastructure. In this paper, we present Proxychain - a novel VoIP authentication protocol based on a modified hash chain construction. Proxychain not only improves performance and scalability, but also offers additional security properties such as mutual authentication. Through experimental analysis we demonstrate an improvement of greater than 1700% of the maximum call throughput possible with Digest authentication in the same architecture. We show that the more efficient authentication mechanisms of Proxychain can be used to improve the overall security of a carrier-scale VoIP network.