Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Modelling misbehaviour in ad hoc networks: a game theoretic approach for intrusion detection
International Journal of Security and Networks
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Anonymous Networking Amidst Eavesdroppers
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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The problem of anonymous wireless networking is considered when adversaries who monitor the transmissions in the network are also capable of compromising a fraction of nodes to extract network information. For a given level of network performance, as measured by network throughput, the problem of maximizing anonymity is studied from a gametheoretic perspective. The metric of anonymity considered is the conditional entropy of network routes given the monitored packet transmission times. In order to provide anonymity, a random subset of nodes (referred to as covert relays) are chosen to generate independent transmission schedules. These covert relays, unless compromised, can effectively hide the flow of traffic through them. Depending on the routes and the throughput requirement, the network designer needs to optimize the choice of covert relays such that anonymity is maximized. Whereas, the eavesdropper needs to optimize the choice of nodes to compromise subject to a constraint on maximum number of monitored nodes, such that the anonymity of the network routes is minimized. This problem is posed as a two player zero-sum game, and it is shown that a unique Nash equilibrium exists for a general category of finite networks. Using numerical examples, the tradeoff between the achievable anonymity and the power of the adversary is demonstrated as a function of the throughput for passive and active adversaries.