Intention is choice with commitment
Artificial Intelligence
Conditioning in possibility theory with strict order norms
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
META-92 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Meta-Programming in Logic
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Fuzzy set and possibility theory-based methods in artificial intelligence
Reasoning with Levels of Modalities in BDI Logic
Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems
Asymmetry thesis and side-effect problems in linear-time and branching-time intention logics
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An integrated possibilistic framework for goal generation in cognitive agents
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Graded BDI models for agent architectures
CLIMA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems
A graded BDI agent model to represent and reason about preferences
Artificial Intelligence
Operational behaviour for executing, suspending, and aborting goals in BDI agent systems
DALT'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Declarative agent languages and technologies VIII
An operational semantics for the goal life-cycle in BDI agents
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The way in which the relationships between beliefs, goals, and intentions are captured by a formalism can have a significant impact on the design of a rational agent. In particular, what Rao and Georgeff underline about the relationships between goals and beliefs is that it is reasonable to require a rational agent not to allow goal-belief inconsistency, while goal-belief incompleteness can be allowed. We study a theoretical framework, grounded in possibility theory, which (i) accounts for the aspects involved in representing and changing beliefs and goals, and (ii) obeys Rao and Georgeff's requirement. We propose a formalization of a possibilistic extension of Bratman's asymmetry thesis to hold between goals and beliefs. Finally, we show that our formalism avoids the side-effect and the transference problems.