Information-theoretic key agreement of multiple terminal: part II: channel model

  • Authors:
  • Amin Aminzadeh Gohari;Venkat Anantharam

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA;Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

This is the second part of a two-part paper on information-theoretically secure secret key agreement. This part covers the secret key capacity under the channel model. In this model, multiple terminals wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from an eavesdropper with unlimited computational resources. The terminals are all connected to a noiseless and authenticated but insecure channel, called the "public channel." Furthermore, the terminals have access to a secure but noisy discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC). The first terminal can choose a sequence of inputs to the DMBC, which has outputs at the other terminals and at the eavesdropper. After each channel use, the terminals can engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over the public channel. At the end, each legitimate terminal should be able to generate the secret key. In this paper, we derive new lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity. In each case, an example is provided to show that the new bound represents a strict improvement over the previously best known bound. This part of the paper is not standalone, and is written under the assumption that the reader has access to Part I, which is published in the same issue.