Multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange

  • Authors:
  • Douglas Stebila;Poornaprajna Udupi;Sheueling Chang

  • Affiliations:
  • Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia;Sun Microsystems Laboratories, Santa Clara, California;-

  • Venue:
  • AISC '10 Proceedings of the Eighth Australasian Conference on Information Security - Volume 105
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We consider a new form of authenticated key exchange which we call multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange, where session establishment depends on successful authentication of multiple short secrets that are complementary in nature, such as a long-term password and a one-time response, allowing the client and server to be mutually assured of each other's identity without directly disclosing private information to the other party. Multi-factor authentication can provide an enhanced level of assurance in higher-security scenarios such as online banking, virtual private network access, and physical access because a multi-factor protocol is designed to remain secure even if all but one of the factors has been compromised. We introduce a security model for multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange protocols, propose an efficient and secure protocol called MFPAK, and provide a security argument to show that our protocol is secure in this model. Our security model is an extension of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model for password-authenticated key exchange and accommodates an arbitrary number of symmetric and asymmetric authentication factors.