A first-order conditional logic for prototypical properties
Artificial Intelligence
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Representing and reasoning with probabilistic knowledge: a logical approach to probabilities
Representing and reasoning with probabilistic knowledge: a logical approach to probabilities
Formulation of tradeoffs in planning under uncertainty
Formulation of tradeoffs in planning under uncertainty
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Impediments to Universal preference-based default theories
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Defaults and probabilities: extensions and coherence
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
What the lottery paradox tells us about default reasoning
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Probabilistic semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning: a survey
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Lp, a logic for representing and reasoning with statistical knowledge
Computational Intelligence
Representing and reasoning with probabilistic knowledge
Representing and reasoning with probabilistic knowledge
A modest, but semantically well founded, inheritance reasoner
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
An analysis of first-order logics of probability
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
IJCAI'87 Proceedings of the 10th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A logic for default reasoning about probabilities
UAI'94 Proceedings of the Tenth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
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There are two common but quite distinct interpretations of probabilities: they can be interpreted as a measure of the extent to which an agent believes an assertion, i.e., as an agent's degree of belief, or they can be interpreted as an assertion of relative frequency, i.e., as a statistical measure. Used as statistical measures probabilities can represent various assertions about the objective statistical state of the world, while used as degrees of belief they can represent various assertions about the subjective state of an agent's beliefs. In this paper we examine how an agent who knows certain statistical facts about the world might infer probabilistic degrees of beliefs in other assertions from these statistics. For example, an agent who knows that most birds fly (a statistical fact) may generate a degree of belief greater than 0.5 in the assertion that Tweety flies given that Tweety is a bird. This inference of degrees of belief from statistical facts is known as direct inference. We develop a formal logical mechanism for performing direct inference. Some of the inferences possible via direct inference are closely related to default inferences. We examine some features of this relationship.