The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Seeing-Is-Believing: Using Camera Phones for Human-Verifiable Authentication
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure Device Pairing based on a Visual Channel (Short Paper)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Simple and effective defense against evil twin access points
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Acoustic Modems for Ubiquitous Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Secure pairing of interface constrained devices
International Journal of Security and Networks
Secure Pairing of "Interface-Constrained" Devices Resistant against Rushing User Behavior
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Treat 'em like other devices: user authentication of multiple personal RFID tags
Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
Caveat eptor: A comparative study of secure device pairing methods
PERCOM '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Proximity-based access control for implantable medical devices
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Usability analysis of secure pairing methods
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Efficient device pairing using "Human-comparable" synchronized audiovisual patterns
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Tapas: design, implementation, and usability evaluation of a password manager
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Secure "pairing" of wireless devices based on auxiliary or out-of-band (OOB) - audio, visual or tactile - communication is a well-established research direction. Lack of good quality interfaces on or physical access to certain constrained devices (e.g., headsets, access points, medical implants) makes pairing a challenging problem in practice. Prior work shows that pairing of constrained devices based on authenticated OOB (A-OOB) channels can be prone to human errors that eventually translate into man-in-the-middle attacks. An alternative and more usable solution is to use OOB channel(s) that are authenticated as well as secret (AS-OOB). AS-OOB pairing can be achieved by simply transmitting the key or a short password over the AS-OOB channel, avoiding potential serious human errors. A higher level goal of this paper is to analyze the security of AS-OOB pairing. More specifically, we take a closer look at three notable prior AS-OOB pairing proposals and challenge the direct or indirect assumption upon which the security of these proposals relies, i.e., the secrecy of underlying or associated audio channels. The first proposal (IMD Pairing [9]) uses a low frequency audio channel to pair an implanted RFID tag with an external reader. The second proposal (PIN-Vibra [20]) uses an automated vibrational channel to pair a mobile phone with a personal RFID tag. The third proposal (BEDA [22]) uses vibration (or blinking) on one device and manually synchronized button pressing on the other device. In particular, we demonstrate the feasibility of eavesdropping over acoustic emanations associated with these methods. Based on our results, we conclude that these methods provide a weaker level of security compared to what was originally assumed or is desired for the pairing operation.