Multiuser Detection
Dynamic Spectrum Access with QoS and Interference Temperature Constraints
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Dynamic spectrum leasing in cognitive radio networks via primary-secondary user power control games
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) framework for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks
Asilomar'09 Proceedings of the 43rd Asilomar conference on Signals, systems and computers
Resource allocation for spectrum underlay in cognitive radio networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications - Part 2
Joint rate and power allocation for cognitive radios in dynamic spectrum access environment
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications - Part 2
Distributed Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (D-DSL) for Spectrum Sharing over Multiple Primary Channels
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Spectrum pooling: an innovative strategy for the enhancement of spectrum efficiency
IEEE Communications Magazine
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Primary user enters the game: performance of dynamic spectrum leasing in cognitive radio networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
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In this paper, we propose the concept of centralized dynamic spectrum leasing (C-DSL), in which multiple primary users belonging to the same primary system participate in the spectrum leasing process with secondary users (potential bidder for spectrum) under centralized control. We develop a new gametheoretic user interaction model suitable for C-DSL in a cognitive radio network. Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (DSL), proposed in [1]-[3] allows active participation of both primary and secondary users in the spectrum sharing process. Motivated by network spectrum utilization considerations, we propose generalizations to the primary system utility function defined in [2], [3] and a new utility function for the secondary users. We also generalize the proposed non-cooperative C-DSL game to allow for linear multiuser detectors at the secondary base stations. We formulate the conditions on the primary system and the secondary user utility functions so that the proposed C-DSL game has desired eqUilibrium properties. We prove that the proposed C-DSL game has unique Nash equilibria (NE) under both matched filter (MF) and linear minimum mean-squared error (LMMSE) receivers. Equilibrium performance of the system and robustness of the proposed game theoretic adaptive implementation are investigated through simulations.