A symbolic generalization of probability theory

Authors:
Adnan Y. Darwiche;Matthew L. Ginsberg
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Venue:
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Year:
1992

Citing 6
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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that it is possible to relax the commitment to numeric degrees of belief while retaining the desirable features of the Bayesian approach for representing and changing states of belief. We first present an abstract representation of states of belief and an associated notion of conditionalization that subsume their Bayesian counterparts. Next, we provide some symbolic and numeric instances of states of belief and their conditionalizations. Finally, we show that patterns of belief change that make Bayesianism so appealing do hold in our framework.