Approximation algorithms for the sex-equal stable marriage problem

  • Authors:

  • Kazuo Iwama;Shuichi Miyazaki;Hiroki Yanagisawa

  • Affiliations:

  • Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan;Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan;IBM Research-Tokyo, Kanagawa-ken, Japan

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The stable marriage problem is a classical matching problem introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is known that for any instance, there exists a solution, and there is a polynomial time algorithm to find one. However, the matching obtained by this algorithm is man-optimal, that is, the matching is favorable for men but unfavorable for women, (or, if we exchange the roles of men and women, the resulting matching is woman-optimal). The sex-equal stable marriage problem, posed by Gusfield and Irving, seeks a stable matching “fair” for both genders. Specifically it seeks a stable matching with the property that the sum of the men's scores is as close as possible to that of the women's. This problem is known to be strongly NP-hard. In this paper, we give a polynomial time algorithm for finding a near optimal solution for the sex-equal stable marriage problem. Furthermore, we consider the problem of optimizing an additional criterion: among stable matchings that are near optimal in terms of the sex-equality, find a minimum egalitarian stable matching. We show that this problem is strongly NP-hard, and give a polynomial time algorithm whose approximation ratio is less than two.