Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Rational Exchange - A Formal Model Based on Game Theory
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
A Game-Based Verification of Non-repudiation and Fair Exchange Protocols
CONCUR '01 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Weakly Secret Bit Commitment: Applications to Lotteries and Fair Exchange
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
Computer Communications
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the correctness of non-repudiation protocols without a Trusted Third Party (TTP) with respect to the fairness property. We first present sufficient syntactic conditions under which probabilistic fairness can be guaranteed and by modelling non-repudiation protocols as games, we use game theory results to show that the best level of fairness such protocols can achieve is probabilistic fairness.