Algebraic-Geometric Codes
Lower bounds for collusion-secure fingerprinting
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal probabilistic fingerprint codes
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting scheme is better than we thought
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Improved decoding of Reed-Solomon and algebraic-geometry codes
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Digital fingerprinting codes: problem statements, constructions, identification of traitors
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Near-Optimal collusion-secure fingerprinting codes for efficiently tracing illegal re-distribution
CSS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cyberspace Safety and Security
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A fingerprinting code is a set of codewords that are embedded in each copy of a digital object with the purpose of making each copy unique. If the fingerprinting code is c-secure with Ζ error, then the decoding of a pirate word created by a coalition of at most c dishonest users, will expose at least one of the guilty parties with probability 1 - Ζ. The Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting codes are n-secure codes with ΖB error, where n also denotes the number of authorized users. Unfortunately, the length the Boneh-Shaw codes should be of order O(n3 log(n/ΖB)), which is prohibitive for practical applications. In this paper, we prove that the Boneh-Shaw codes are (c )-secure for lengths of order O(nc2 log(n/ΖB)). Moreover, in this paper it is also shown how to use these codes to construct binary fingerprinting codes of length L = O(c6 log(c/Ζ) log n), with probability of error Ζ B and an identification algorithm of complexity poly(log n) = poly(L). These results improve in some aspects the best known schemes and with a much more simple construction.