USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Towards trustworthy computing systems: taking microkernels to the next level
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
SMM rootkits: a new breed of OS independent malware
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
SP 800-147. BIOS Protection Guidelines
SP 800-147. BIOS Protection Guidelines
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Trusted computing has been explored through several international initiatives. Trust in a platform generally requires a subset of its components to be trusted (typically, the CPU, the chipset and a virtual machine hypervisor). These components are granted maximal privileges and constitute the so called Trusted Computing Base (TCB), the size of which should be minimal. The rest of the platform is only granted limited privileges and cannot perform security-critical operations. A few initiatives aim at excluding the BIOS from the TCB in particular (e.g., Intel® TxT and AMD SVM/SKINIT). However, the BIOS is responsible for providing some objects that need to be trusted for the computer to work properly. This paper focuses on two of these objects, the SMI handler and the ACPI tables, which are responsible for the configuration and the power management of the platform. We study to what extent these two components shall reasonably be trusted. Despite the protections that are implemented, we show that an attacker can hide functions in either structure to escalate privileges. The main contributions of our work are to present an original mechanism that may be used by attackers to alter the SMI handler, and to describe how rogue functions triggered by an external stimulus can be injected inside ACPI tables (in our case, the attacker will plug and unplug the power supply twice in a row). We also explore the countermeasures that would prevent such modifications.