Trade & Cap: a customer-managed, market-based system for trading bandwidth allowances at a shared link

  • Authors:
  • Jorge Londoño;Azer Bestavros;Nikolaos Laoutaris

  • Affiliations:
  • Boston University;Boston University;Telefonica Research, Barcelona, Spain

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared network link so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, a service provider acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each agent selfishly chooses reserved bandwidth slots to acquire in support of primary network usage activities. In the second phase, these agents acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of a presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" - both of which are determined by the outcomes of the trading phase, and by a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using Internet traffic traces, our experimental results demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.