Multi-agent belief revision with linked preferences

  • Authors:
  • Jan Van Eijck;Floor Sietsma

  • Affiliations:
  • Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • LOFT'08 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Logic and the foundations of game and decision theory
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

In this paper we forge a connection between dynamic epistemic logics of belief revision on one hand and studies of collective judgement and multi-agent preference change on the other. Belief revision in the spirit of dynamic epistemic logic uses updating with relational substitutions to change the beliefs of individual agents. Collective judgement in social choice theory studies the collective outcomes of individual belief changes. We start out from the logic of communication and change (LCC) without constraints, and then study the effects of imposing a single constraint, namely the constraint that the agent's preference relations are linked. Finally, we show that the resulting framework can be used to model consensus seeking procedures. We focus on the case of plenary Dutch meetings. In Dutch meetings, a belief change (or rather: preference change) is performed for all agents in the meeting if a majority believes (or: is in favour of) the proposition that is under discussion. A special case of these meetings is judgement aggregation, and we apply our framework to the discursive dilemma in this field. Our framework has obvious connections to coalition logic and social choice theory.