Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering

Authors:
Mark Klein;Gabriel A. Moreno;David C. Parkes;Kurt Wallnau
Affiliations:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Harvard SEAS, Cambridge, MA, USA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Software-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society. The resulting interconnectedness and associated complexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals. Thus, contemporary software engineering is plagued by incentive conflicts, in settling on design features, allocating resources during the development of products, and allocating computational resources at runtime. In this position paper, we describe some of these problems and outline a research agenda in bridging to the economic theory of mechanism design, which seeks to align incentives in multi-agent systems with private information and conflicting goals. The ultimate goal is to advance a principled methodology for the design of incentive-compatible approaches to manage the dynamic processes of software engineering.