Cryptanalysis of a message recognition protocol by Mashatan and Stinson

  • Authors:
  • Madeline González Muñiz;Rainer Steinwandt

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL;Department of Mathematical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL

  • Venue:
  • ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2009

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

At CANS 2008, Mashatan and Stinson suggested a message recognition protocol for ad hoc pervasive networks. The protocol provides a procedure to resynchronize in case of a (possibly adversarial) disruption of communication. We show that this resynchronization process does not provide the functionality intended and in fact enables an adversary to create selective forgeries. The computational effort for the attack is negligible and allows the insertion of arbitrary messages.