SLIC: A Selfish Link-Based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
From Selfish Nodes to Cooperative Networks " Emergent Link-Based Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '04 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Replica management should be a game
EW 10 Proceedings of the 10th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Towards Cooperative, Self-Organised Replica Management
SASO '07 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems
Distributed task allocation in social networks
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
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In a system of selfish-oriented agents, cooperation is a key feature to fulfill global goals. Multiagent systems are designed of agents that should behave individually rational and therefore often have conflicting goals. The capacity constraints can lead to egoistic behavior, especially in capacity-bounded multiagent systems. We present an approach that is based on a trust mechanism. We will show that this mechanism leads to more altruism and therefore to a better system performance. In order to evaluate our approach, we deal with a job allocation problem where the jobs consist of tasks that require specific skills. Agents are equipped with a small subset of skills only and need cooperation partners to fulfill their jobs. Although we consider non-free cooperation, the percentage of completed jobs reaches a high level, which is an indicator for cooperation.