Formal certification of a compiler back-end or: programming a compiler with a proof assistant
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
A Verified Shared Capability Model
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
seL4: formal verification of an operating-system kernel
Communications of the ACM
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
capDL: a language for describing capability-based systems
Proceedings of the first ACM asia-pacific workshop on Workshop on systems
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Last year, the NICTA L4.verified project produced a formal machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proof that the C code of the seL4 OS microkernel correctly implements its abstract implementation. This paper gives a brief overview of the proof together with its main implications and assumptions, and paints a vision on how this verified kernel can be used for gaining assurance of overall system security on the code level for systems of a million lines of code or more.