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Today, the majority of security errors in software systems are due to implementation errors, as opposed to flaws in fundamental algorithms (e.g., cryptography). Type-safe languages, such as Java, help rule out a class of these errors, such as code-injection through buffer overruns. But attackers simply shift to implementation flaws above the level of the primitive operations of the language (e.g., SQL-injection attacks). Thus, next-generation languages need type systems that can express and enforce application-specific security policies.