Deriving safety cases for hierarchical structure in model-based development

  • Authors:
  • Nurlida Basir;Ewen Denney;Bernd Fischer

  • Affiliations:
  • ECS, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK;SGT, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA;ECS, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

  • Venue:
  • SAFECOMP'10 Proceedings of the 29th international conference on Computer safety, reliability, and security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for actual production code, in particular in mathematical and engineering domains. However, since code generators are typically not qualified, there is no guarantee that their output satisfies the system requirements, or is even safe. Here we present an approach to systematically derive safety cases that argue along the hierarchical structure in model-based development. The safety cases are constructed mechanically using a formal analysis, based on automated theorem proving, of the automatically generated code. The analysis recovers the model structure and component hierarchy from the code, providing independent assurance of both code and model. It identifies how the given system safety requirements are broken down into component requirements, and where they are ultimately established, thus establishing a hierarchy of requirements that is aligned with the hierarchical model structure. The derived safety cases reflect the results of the analysis, and provide a high-level argument that traces the requirements on the model via the inferred model structure to the code. We illustrate our approach on flight code generated from hierarchical Simulink models by Real-Time Workshop.