Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Hop integrity in computer networks
ICNP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 International Conference on Network Protocols
Multiuser cryptographic techniques
AFIPS '76 Proceedings of the June 7-10, 1976, national computer conference and exposition
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One of the fundamental concepts in network security is the active adversary. Such an adversary is defined, in the classic paper by Dolev and Yao, as an adversary that (in addition to eavesdropping passively), can "impersonate another user and ... alter or replay the message". Thus, the original definition of an active adversary includes the ability to spoof (lie about its identity). In this paper, we study the special case of active adversaries who are restricted from spoofing. As in the original study by Dolev and Yao, the motivation of our adversary is to break the confidentiality of the message being transmitted using a cascade protocol (a protocol in which neither sender nor receiver name stamps the messages they send). We prove a very surprising result: our weaker adversary, who is restricted from spoofing, is in fact exactly as powerful as the unrestricted Dolev-Yao adversary with respect to the goal of breaking confidentiality of cascade protocols.