Privacy-preserving, taxable bank accounts

  • Authors:
  • Elli Androulaki;Binh Vo;Steven Bellovin

  • Affiliations:
  • Columbia University;Columbia University;Columbia University

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Current banking systems do not aim to protect user privacy. Purchases made from a single bank account can be linked to each other by many parties. This could be addressed in a straight-forward way by generating unlinkable credentials from a single master credential using Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's algorithm; however, if bank accounts are taxable, some report must be made to the tax authority about each account. Assuming a flat-rate taxation mechanism (which can be extended to a progressive one) and using unlinkable credentials, digital cash, and zero knowledge proofs of knowledge, we present a solution that prevents anyone, even the tax authority, from knowing which accounts belong to which users, or from being able to link any account to another or to purchases or deposits.