Supervisory control of a class of discrete event processes
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
On controllability and normality of discrete event dynamical systems
Systems & Control Letters
A taxonomy of computer program security flaws
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Experimenting with Quantitative Evaluation Tools for Monitoring Operational Security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Probability and statistics with reliability, queuing and computer science applications
Probability and statistics with reliability, queuing and computer science applications
Fault Tolerance: Principles and Practice
Fault Tolerance: Principles and Practice
Survivability: Protecting Your Critical Systems
IEEE Internet Computing
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A method for modeling and quantifying the security attributes of intrusion tolerant systems
Performance Evaluation - Dependable systems and networks-performance and dependability symposium (DSN-PDS) 2002: Selected papers
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In this paper, we describe three different state space models for analyzing the security of a software system. In the first part of this paper, we utilize a semi-Markov Process (SMP) to model the transitions between the security states of an abstract software system. The SMP model can be solved to obtain the probability of reaching security failed states along with the meantime to security failure (MTTSF). In the second part of the paper, we use a discrete event dynamic system model of security dynamics. We show how to derive events and transitions from existing security taxonomies. We then apply theory of discrete event control to define safety properties of the computer system in terms of the basic concepts of controllability used in discrete event control for two special sublanguages Ksand Kv. These languages correspond to maximally robust controllable sub-languages. In the third approach, we show that by associating cost with the state transitions, the security quantification problem can be casted as Markov decision problem (MDP). This MDP can be solved to obtain an optimal controllable language Ks* ⊆ Ks the gives the minimal cost safe security policy.