Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

  • Authors:
  • Jon Cogburn;Jason Megil

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Philosophy, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA 70803;, Norfolk, USA 23505

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We first discuss Michael Dummett's philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom's philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church's Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.